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#2A-4/27/88 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MIRIAM SOFFER, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9794 
QUEENS COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
MIRIAM SOFFER, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Miriam Soffer (charging party) excepts to the dismissal, as 
deficient, of her improper practice charge by the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). The 
charge alleges that the Queens College of the City University of 
New York (Queens College) violated §209-a.l(e) of the Public 
Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) when, for the spring 1988 
semester, charging party was assigned a workload of 14 weekly 
contact hours rather than a maximum of 12 weekly contact hours as 
required by the expired collective bargaining agreement between 
Queens College and the Professional Staff Congress/CUNY, the 
charging party's collective bargaining agent. 
The Director dismissed the charge as deficient upon the 
ground that only a recognized or certified bargaining agent, and 
not an individual bargaining unit member, has standing to file a 
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charge pursuant to §209-a.l(e) of the Act. The Director based 
the dismissal of the charge upon a decision recently issued by 
this Board involving the same charging party and respondent, and 
charging party's bargaining agent.-i/ Taking our holding in that 
case into account, the Director reasoned that because the 
bargaining agent, and not an individual employee who benefits 
from the result of the bargain, is the party to the negotiating 
process which §209-a.l(e) is intended to protect, only the 
bargaining agent, and not the individual employee, has standing 
to allege its violation. 
While we fully recognize that members of a bargaining unit 
are substantially affected by violations by employers of §§209-
a.l(d) and 209-a.l(e) of the Act, it is our determination that 
i 
the right to seek redress of such violations by an employer flows 
to the employee's bargaining agent, which has the duty and right 
to negotiate on behalf of its members. Where, for arbitrary, 
discriminatory or bad faith reasons, an affected employee's 
bargaining agent fails or refuses to take appropriate action, a 
duty of fair representation claim may arise.2/ Nevertheless, an 
individual bargaining unit member does not have the right to act 
Vsee City University of New York and PSC/CUNY (Soffer), 2 0 PERB 
^3051, at p. 3111 n. 2 (1987), in which we "adopt[ed] the finding 
that only bargaining agents, and not their individual members 
have standing to claim violations of §209-a.l(e) of the Act." 
2/ UFT Local 2 (Greenburg), 15 PERB 54591 (1982), aff'd 16 PERB 
53004 (1983). 
y 
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independently and in the place of the bargaining agent in the 
filing of charges relating to alleged violations of the 
employer's bargaining duties. There can be no question that the 
purpose of §209-a.l(e) of the Act is to impose a duty upon 
employers to maintain the status quo pending negotiations with 
the bargaining agent representing its employees of a successor 
bargaining agreement. This provision of the Act is not intended 
to create a right of individual enforcement of an expired 
collective bargaining agreement. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the Director's 
determination that charging party is without standing to file an 
improper practice charge alleging a violation of 
§209-a.l(e) of the Act. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: April 27, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9902 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS C. BARRY, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Thomas C. Barry, charging party, excepts to the decision 
of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) which dismissed, as deficient, his 
charge alleging a violation by the United University 
Professions (UUP) of §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act). 
Barry's charge alleges that UUP's 1988-89 agency fee 
refund procedure "has never been officially published or 
acknowledged, or communicated to any other independent 
employees", and that UUP's procedure is deficient because it 
does not state on its face that "it [shall] be communicated 
to each independent employee by individual delivery of mail 
on an annual basis". 
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The Director dismissed the charge upon the ground that, 
as framed, Barry's charge is filed on behalf of "other 
independent employees", in contradiction of PERB's 
procedures, which do not permit class actions. The second 
ground for the Director's dismissal is that Barry's charge 
contains no factual allegations which could establish that 
UUP's duty to communicate its agency fee refund procedures to 
nonmembers who are in its unit arises more than three months 
prior to the first point at which a nonmember would have 
resort to the procedure. The Director, in essence, 
concluded that the charge failed to state any claim upon 
which relief could be granted with regard to the allegation 
that UUP violated the Act when it failed to communicate its 
agency fee refund procedure prior to January 15, 1988, when 
the charge was filed. 
The Director also dismissed that portion of the charge 
which asserts a Taylor Law violation in the failure to 
specify in the agency fee refund procedure a date and means 
by which communication of the procedure itself will be 
disseminated to nonmembers. The Director determined that, 
because the 1988-89 UUP procedure has been approved by this 
Board [See UUP (Barry, Eson & Gallup^. 20 PERB f3052 (1987)], 
and because Barry was a party to the case in which approval 
i/under UUP * s procedure, which was annexed to the charge, the 
period for filing objections to the use of agency fee monies 
for purposes not permitted by the Act over objection, began 
on April 15, 1988 for the 1988-89 fiscal year. 
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of the procedure was issued [See UUP (Barry, Eson & Gallup), 20 
PERB f3039 (1987)] Barry is precluded from obtaining a review of 
that Board determination by means of a new improper practice 
charge, rather than by means of appeal of the earlier decision 
and order. 
In his exceptions, Barry asserts that he does in fact have 
standing to allege a failure of UUP to communicate its agency 
fee refund procedure to all agency fee payers, notwithstanding 
his own personal receipt of a copy of the procedure. Second, 
Barry asserts that, although he was provided with a letter by 
the Director's designee, setting forth certain deficiencies of 
his charge, the deficiency letter did not contain any reference 
to the ground relied upon by the Director in his dismissal of 
the charge that the charge was, essentially, premature when 
filed because it was filed approximately three months before the 
first step in the procedure was to take place and no factually 
supported claim was made that a Taylor Law duty existed at that 
time to disseminate the procedure to affected persons. He 
claims that, had he had notice of this alleged deficiency, he 
would have been able to refute it by establishing that the 
procedure should have been disseminated to all agency fee payers 
in September 1987, when he himself received it. 
Barry's third exception argues that he is in fact entitled 
to bring a charge alleging deficiencies in the 1988-89 agency 
fee procedure promulgated by UUP, notwithstanding the Board's 
approval of that procedure in a prior decision. 
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DISCUSSION 
While we have held many times that PERB's procedures do 
not permit the filing of class action improper practice 
charges, and that PERB will accordingly not order remedial 
relief on a class-wide basis, we have also held that an agency 
fee payer has standing to file an improper practice charge 
alleging that certain aspects of an agency fee refund 
procedure are violative of his own Taylor Law rights, even if 
he has acted in conformity with a challenged procedure. 
2/ 
Accordingly, the charging party is correct in arguing that he 
is not precluded from filing an improper practice charge 
alleging that UUP has failed to publish or otherwise 
communicate its agency fee refund procedure to all agency fee 
payers, despite the fact that he personally obtained a copy. 
Secondly, while we agree with the Director's 
determination that the charging party may not obtain review 
of the written procedure previously approved by this Board in 
a case to which he was a party, he does, in our view, have 
the right to claim, as he does in this charge, that the 
2/ln UUP (Barry. Eson & Gallup1 . 20 PERB J[3039 (1987), for 
example, we entertained charges that the objection period 
provided by UUP's agency fee refund procedure was unreasonably 
brief and scheduled at a time when academic programs were not 
in session, finding Taylor Law violations as a result. We did 
so, notwithstanding the fact that each of the charging parties 
complied with the requirement that they file objections during 
the time frame established by UUP in its procedure. The 
charging parties had standing to challenge the validity of the 
procedure despite the fact that they were not prejudiced by it 
in the sense that they were unable, or failed, to comply with 
it. 
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procedure is silent as to some matter or matters which should 
be included therein. This is so, whether the claimed 
deficiency is included in the written procedure or included 
as a matter or practice, if not already litigated in the 
previous charge. 
Having made these findings, we now turn to the question 
of whether Barry's charge sets forth allegations which, if 
proven, would constitute an improper practice within the 
meaning of §209-a.2(a) of the Act. 
We find, first, that Barry's claim that "[T]here is 
nothing in the [agency fee refund procedure] which requires 
that it be communicated to each independent employee by 
individual delivery of mail on an annual basis" fails to 
establish a Taylor Law violation. There is no inherent 
obligation on the part of an employee organization to 
indicate in its written procedure when, where, and by what 
means an agency fee refund procedure will be communicated to 
agency fee payers. If, in fact, the procedure is 
communicated in such a manner as to give agency fee payers 
reasonable advance notice of the steps and requirements of 
the procedure, the failure to include the manner in which 
communication and dissemination will take place in the 
procedure itself does not give rise to a Taylor Law 
violation. We accordingly find that the omission from UUP's 
agency fee refund procedure of details concerning when and in 
what manner the 1988-89 procedure will be communicated to 
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agency fee payers fails to state a claim of violation of 
§209-a.2(a) of the Act. The Director properly dismissed so 
much of the improper practice charge as makes this 
allegation. 
It remains to be considered whether the failure, in 
fact, of UUP to communicate its agency fee refund procedure 
for the 1988-89 fiscal year prior to January 15, 1988 (when 
the charge was filed), constitutes a violation of §209-a.2(a) 
of the Act. We find that it does not. Barry asserts in his 
exceptions that UUP violated the Act when it failed to 
communicate the agency fee refund procedure, not by January 
15, 1988, when the charge was filed, but by September 1987, 
when the procedure was originally promulgated. While there 
would be nothing to prevent UUP from disseminating its 
procedure many months in advance of the first step of the 
procedure, there is no basis upon which it could be claimed 
that the failure to do so gives rise to an improper practice 
charge. In fact, in UUP (Eson), 11 PERB f3074 (1978), this 
Board found that only 10 days * notice of the refund procedure 
prior to the first step of the procedure by agency fee payers 
did not constitute an interference, restraint or 
coercion of employees in the exercise of their rights 
pursuant to §202 of the Act. We accordingly affirm the 
Director's dismissal of the charge, insofar as it alleges 
that UUP violated the Act when it failed to communicate its 
agency fee refund procedure to agency fee payers either by 
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January 15, 1988, the filing date of the charge, or by 
September 1987, the date when Barry alleges in his exceptions 
that the procedure should in fact have been disseminated. 
Based upon the foregoing, the dismissal of the charge by 
the Director is affirmed, and IT IS ORDERED THAT the charge 
be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
4/ 
DATED: April 27, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
3/we are mindful of the point raised by Barry in his 
exceptions that dismissal of his charge upon a ground not 
included in the "deficiency" letter previously sent to him, 
effectively precluded him from responding at the Director's 
level, and have taken administrative steps to avoid such a 
result in the future. However, the failure to place Barry on 
advance notice of one of several grounds for dismissal of his 
charge does not constitute reversible error, since the 
Director is not required by our Rules to issue a "deficiency" 
letter or to set forth each and every ground upon which 
dismissal might occur. Furthermore, Barry has not, in his 
exceptions, alleged that any new or different facts would 
have been asserted by him had he received advance notice of 
this ground for dismissal. Accordingly, no prejudice has 
been established. See NYC Transit Authority, 20 PERB J[3057, 
at p. 3125 n. 2 (1987). 
^/Dismissal in this case is without prejudice to the right of 
Barry or other agency fee payers to file an improper practice 
charge alleging that they have not in fact received notice of 
UUP's 1988-89 agency fee refund procedure within a reasonable 
time prior to the first step of the procedure, which, on its 
face, took place on April 15, 1988. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RUSH-HENRIETTA EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, 
BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS, BUS MECHANICS 
CHAPTER, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9463 
RUSH-HENRIETTA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
RUSH-HENRIETTA EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, 
TEACHERS CHAPTER, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9464 
RUSH-HENRIETTA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
RUSH-HENRIETTA EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, 
AIDES CHAPTER, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9477 
RUSH-HENRIETTA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
GILBERT BIANCUCCI, Senior Field Representative, 
NYSUT, for Charging Parties 
HARRIS, BEACH, WILCOX, RUBIN & LEVEY (JAMES A. SPITZ, 
JR., ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Rush-
Henrietta Central School District (District) to an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) decision dated February 9, 1988, which, in three 
consolidated cases, found that the District violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally prohibited smoking in all District buildings and 
buses. The resolution enacted by the Board of Education on April 
14, 1987, to be effective May 7, 1987,A/ superseded a practice 
which had permitted employees to smoke in work areas of the 
building, except when students were present (Stipulation of the 
parties). Since enactment of the Board's resolution, employees 
wishing to smoke may do so only outside of the District's 
buildings. 
In concluding that the imposition of a complete ban on 
smoking in District buildings and buses constitutes a mandatory 
subject of bargaining, the ALJ found that (1) No free-standing 
public policy against smoking can be identified and relied upon by 
the District in support of its actions; (2) The blanket 
prohibition against smoking (as compared to the previous practice 
A/By resolution of April 28, 1987, the Board of Education 
reaffirmed its April 14 resolution following receipt of a 
decision of the New York State Court of Appeals in Boreali v. 
Axelrod. 130 A.D.2d 107 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd. 71 N.Y.2d (1987), 
which struck down regulations promulgated by the Public Health 
Council prohibiting smoking in many public areas. 
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of prohibiting smoking only when students are present) primarily 
affects employees in the terms and conditions of their employment; 
(3) No legislation has been enacted which would have the effect of 
superseding the District's duty under the Act, if a duty exists, 
to bargain concerning the prohibition against smoking as a term 
and condition of employment; and (4) A balancing of interests is 
appropriate to determine whether the employer's objectively 
demonstrable need to act in furtherance of its mission outweighs 
the bargaining agent's entitlement to negotiation before changes 
in terms and conditions of employment can be made. 
The bulk of the District's exceptions relate to the argument 
that the ALJ's decision fails to take into account the duty of 
the District to provide protection to its 5,500 students who are 
under its care and supervision. However, the issue before the 
ALJ, and before us, is not whether the District is entitled to 
act unilaterally to protect its students from the effects of 
secondhand smoke, 
2/ 
but whether employees should be prohibited 
from smoking in District facilities outside the presence of 
students. 
2/No evidence was presented at the hearing that the practice in 
effect prior to the enactment of the April 14, 1987 resolution, 
which prohibited smoking by employees when students were present, 
failed to provide adequate protection to students from exposure 
to secondhand smoke, or that a complete ban on smoking was 
necessary to provide such protection to students. 
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We recently had occasion to address the issue of whether 
unilateral imposition of a no-smoking requirement by an employer 
constitutes a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act [County_of 
Niagara (Mount View Health Facility). 21 PERB f3014 (decided 
March 11, 1988)]. In that case, the Board concluded that no 
free-standing policy exists which would require a public employer 
to prohibit smoking in the workplace. We further held that, in 
the absence of legislation requiring such prohibition, 
regulations affecting employee smoking constitute work rules 
subject to the balancing test outlined in County of Montgomery. 
18 PERB 53077 (1985), in order to determine whether unilateral 
promulgation of work rules constitutes a violation of the Act. 
Applying the County of Montgomery balancing test to the 
employer's prohibition in County of Niagara, we found that 
smoking regulations do affect terms and conditions of employment, 
and stated: 
In order to be accorded the right to act 
unilaterally insofar as smoking regulations 
are concerned, a public employer must 
demonstrate that there is a need related to 
its mission for the restrictions which it 
imposed on employees smoking in its 
facilities. [footnote omitted]. Further, 
the employer must show that those 
restrictions do not go beyond what is needed 
to further its mission. 
County of Niagara (Mount View Health 
Facility^. supra at p. . 
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In the instant case, the record establishes that the Board 
of Education of the District initially met to consider enacting 
a resolution to limit smoking to certain specific areas of its 
facilities. After being informed, however, that the cost of 
ventilating and adapting areas for smoking would be 
substantial, the Board of Education voted, instead, to prohibit 
smoking entirely. The AKT found, and we agree, that the 
decision to eliminate smoking entirely, rather than to limit it 
to certain specific areas, was one which was economically 
based, and did not depend for its enactment upon considerations 
necessary to its mission. There is, in fact, no evidence 
contained in the record to support a claim that the complete 
prohibition against smoking in District facilities was 
necessitated by evidence of a health hazard to students, since 
it was not established that students were coming into contact 
with secondhand smoke prior to enactment of the at-issue 
resolution. 
In view of the foregoing, and in accordance with our 
decision in County of Niagara (Mount View Health Facility). supra, 
we conclude, as did the AKT, that a balancing test is appropriate, 
and that application of the balancing test fully supports the 
ALJ's finding that the smoking ban herein is a mandatory subject 
of negotiations. We accordingly affirm the ALT holding that the 
District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act when it unilaterally 
banned smoking in District buildings and buses. 
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We have carefully considered the remaining exceptions 
raised by the District, and deny them in their entirety. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District: 
1. Rescind its April 14 and April 28, 1987 
prohibitions against smoking in District 
buildings and buses insofar as it applies to 
unit employees; 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the charging 
parties regarding the subject matter at issue; 
and 
3. Post a notice in the form attached in all 
locations ordinarily used to post written 
communications to unit employees. 
DATED: April 27, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member/ 
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APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Rush-Henrietta Central School 
District in units represented by the Rush-Henrietta Employees' 
Association, Buildings and Grounds, Bus Mechanics Chapter, 
NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, the Rush-Henrietta Employees' Association, 
Teachers Chapter, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, and the Rush-Henrietta 
Employees' Association, Aides Chapter, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, 
that the District: 
1. Will rescind its April 14 and April 28, 1987 
prohibitions against smoking in District buildings 
and buses insofar as it applies to unit employees, and 
2. Will negotiate in good faith with the charging parties 
regarding the subject matter at issue. 
RUSH-HENRIETTA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. _ _ far* 1153b 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALEXANDRIA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer/Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3316 
ALEXANDRIA BAY SCHOOL UNIT OF THE JEFFERSON 
COUNTY LOCAL 823 OF THE CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 9, 1987, the Alexandria Central School District 
(employer/petitioner) filed a timely petition for decertification 
of the Alexandria Bay School Unit of the Jefferson County Local 
823 of the Civil Service Employees Association (intervenor), the 
current negotiating representative for employees in the following 
unit: 
Included: Bus Drivers, Cook, Food Service Helper, 
Automotive Helper, Assistant Mechanic, 
Custodian. 
Excluded: Secretarial Personnel, Transportation Director, 
Cook-Manager, Head Custodian, Head Auto 
Mechanic. 
Upon consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held 
on April 5, 1988. The results of this election show that the 
majority of eligible employees in the unit who cast valid ballots 
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no longer desire to be represented for purposes of collective 
negotiations by the intervenor. -1/ 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it 
hereby is, decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: April 27, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
-<L~~ £~ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
1/ Of the 19 ballots cast, 3 were for representation and 16 
against representation. There were no challenged ballots. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THE CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3312 
SOUTH ORANGETOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All full and regular part-time employees, 
including bus drivers, maintenance employees 
and custodians. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
r. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOCES UNITED EMPLOYEES, NYSUT/AFT, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-3324 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES #1 - MONROE COUNTY, 
Employer, 
- and -
BOCES #1 EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NEA, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATION AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules and Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the BOCES United Employees, 
NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named employer, in the 
unit described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Case No. C-3324 Page 2 
Unit: Included: Regularly employed full time and part 
time professional employees who are 
required to be licensed or certified, 
including the titles of: occupational 
or vocational education teacher, 
special education teacher, guidance 
counselor, counselor, school psychologist, 
school social worker, school nurse teacher, 
speech therapist, teaching assistant, 
registered nurse, occupational therapist, 
occupational therapist assistant, physical 
therapist, job developer, remedial reading 
teacher, regular substitute teacher who is 
employed for a term or more, school library 
media specialist, speech-language pathologist, 
special education summer school teachers who 
teach in the summer as an extension of a 
regular academic year course, and English 
as a second language (ESOL). 
Excluded: District Superintendent of schools, assistant 
or associate superintendents, director, 
coordinator, principal, supervisor, other 
employees requiring certification as an 
administrator, substitutes other than regular 
substitutes, casual and temporary employees, 
all other employees, adult and continuing 
education teacher, and summer school teacher. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the BOCES United Employees, 
NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
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either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
Dated: April 27, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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